Australia committed to 10 extra days of mandated fuel stockholding and about 1 billion litres of government-owned reserve by 2030 — the August 2026 consultation paper states there is little to no spare jet fuel storage capacity and limited spare diesel capacity, and the model it puts out for consultation leaves building and owning that storage outside government

What is happening?

Australia requires fuel importers and refiners to hold minimum stocks of petrol, diesel and jet fuel. The instrument is the Minimum Stockholding Obligation, created by the Fuel Security Act 2021 and operating since 2023, and it covers entities representing 100 percent of the petrol and jet fuel supplied domestically and 98 percent of the diesel.

In May 2026 the federal government announced two additions at once. The obligation is to rise by 10 days for all three fuels by 2030. Alongside it a government-owned stockpile, the Australian Fuel Security Reserve, is to hold about 1 billion litres by the end of 2030, with 3.2 billion dollars allocated in the 2026-27 budget.

Neither exists yet. The reserve is proposed to be established in legislation, and that legislation has not been made. The uplift has not been written into the obligation rules. In August 2026 the department published a consultation paper setting out how both would be designed; consultation closed 2026-09-15, and the paper states that decisions on the key policy questions are expected by the end of 2026.

The same paper states the constraint. It describes storage as the critical enabler of fuel security, and reports that extra stockholding cannot physically happen, or be deployed effectively, unless there is enough storage capacity in suitable locations. On what is available now it reports that recent stockholding data suggests there is currently sufficient capacity to support a 10-day uplift for petrol, and that there is little to no spare capacity for jet fuel storage and limited spare capacity for diesel storage. It further states that the reserve and the obligation uplift may compete for access to storage infrastructure, particularly for diesel and jet fuel, which could affect implementation timing and costs.

Under the model put out for consultation, government would not build, own or provide storage infrastructure. The department states it intends to provide support for co-investment in storage, and records that the quantum of that support and the criteria for accessing it remain design considerations rather than settled figures.

Whose problem is this?

The body that set the number of days is not the body that has to find the tanks, and the paper does not name who will build the capacity that both programmes need.

Where does this problem end?

The boundary matters because one document holds both the promise and the constraint. Nothing here disputes that more stock is wanted. What is unsettled is where the stock would physically sit and who would pay to build the place.

What is the state now, and what should it be?

Now

What it should be — taken only from the documents of the institutions that set it.

No source opened here states a target for the package expressed in the International Energy Agency unit of days of net imports, and none states how the obligation days and the reserve days add together. The target set above is therefore complete only in the units the government has chosen to use.

How big is it?

The sources opened for this document measure the problem in litres and in days of cover, and none of them turns either unit into a count of people.

The uplift. The paper estimates the additional stock at roughly 430 ML of petrol, 930 ML of diesel and 250 ML of jet fuel, calculated on calendar year 2025 import and refinery production volumes.

The reserve. About 1 billion litres by the end of 2030, proposed as about 920 ML of diesel and 240 ML of jet fuel, each described as about 10 days at 2025 consumption levels. The paper gives the two component volumes and the total and does not state the relationship between them.

The space they have to fit into. The paper carries a diagram labelled 4.9 GL for diesel storage and 1.1 GL for jet fuel storage. No sentence in the paper says whether those labels are tank capacity or stock currently held, so they cannot be subtracted from anything.

The exposure behind the litres is stated only as a share. The paper puts liquid fuels at more than half of final energy consumption in Australia, about 2.5 times the share taken by electricity, and does not break that down by sector, by region or by household.

Under what conditions does it arise?

1. The unit of the promise is not the unit of the constraint. An obligation is written as a number of days and discharged as litres in a tank in a particular place. Days can be added by a decision taken in a budget. Capacity is built over years and by whoever decides to build it.

2. Two programmes draw on the same capacity. The uplift falls on obligated importers and refiners. The reserve is owned by government. The paper states that the two may compete for access to storage infrastructure, particularly for diesel and jet fuel.

3. The scarcity is uneven and the uplift is not. The paper reports sufficient capacity for a 10-day petrol uplift, little to no spare capacity for jet fuel and limited spare capacity for diesel. The same 10 days applies to all three fuels.

4. Most of the obligation sits with importers, whose targets are already the higher ones. Two refineries are operating. In the current table the importer target exceeds the refiner target for every fuel, and for diesel it is 32 days against 20.

5. The obligation can be dialled down when supply is tight. The Act carries ministerial powers of temporary reduction and suspension, and a reduction of up to 20 percent limited to petrol and diesel was made by instrument during the 2026 oil market disruption. The register records that instrument as applying to 2026-06-30 and as no longer in force; the consultation paper footnote records a reduction running to 2026-09-30. The two accounts do not agree and the instrument that would bridge them was not among the documents opened.

What has been tried?

Each step so far has moved either the number of days or the money attached to it. The storage that those days have to sit in is the subject of support the department says it intends to provide, and that support has neither an amount nor criteria for access.

What was found?

Why is it still unsolved?

Supply shortage — the binding constraint is not the number of days but the tanks those days have to sit in, and the department states that for jet fuel there is little to no spare capacity and for diesel only limited spare capacity.

A stockholding obligation is written as a number of days. The thing that discharges it is a tank in a particular place, plumbed into a particular terminal. Days can be added by a decision taken in a budget, and capacity is built over years by someone who has decided to build it. The paper states this directly: additional stockholding cannot be physically achieved or effectively deployed without sufficient storage capacity in the right locations.

Two programmes now draw on that same capacity. One raises the obligation on importers and refiners by 10 days for every fuel. The other places about 1 billion litres of government-owned stock into storage that government proposes not to own. The paper states the two may compete for access, particularly for diesel and jet fuel — which is exactly where it reports spare capacity as limited or absent. The scarcity is uneven across the three fuels and the uplift is not: the same 10 days applies to the fuel with sufficient capacity and to the fuel with little to none.

The design questions enter after that, as reasons the shortage persists rather than as the shortage itself. The model put to consultation leaves building and owning storage outside government, and the support the department says it intends to provide for co-investment has no stated amount and no stated criteria. So the timing of the uplift rests on investment decisions by the parties that would have to take them, and the paper itself records that the competition for storage could affect implementation timing and costs.

Nothing is settled yet. Consultation closed in September 2026, the reserve has no statute, the uplift has no rule, and the paper says the key decisions are expected by the end of the year. Until they are taken, the quantity commitments stand as figures with a date attached, and the capacity to hold them stands as an open question raised in the same document that made the commitments.

What observation would mean it is solved?

Candidates — (a) the rules that set the obligation are amended so the target days rise by 10 for all three fuels, and reported holdings meet the raised targets (b) the reserve is established in legislation and holds about 1 billion litres (c) storage capacity in service for diesel and jet fuel rises at the locations where the stock has to sit.

(a) alone counts a rule. A target day count can be raised in an instrument without a litre moving, and the same Act carries powers of temporary reduction and suspension that were used in 2026. An obligation that can be lowered by instrument is a different observation from stock standing in a tank.

(b) alone counts litres but not availability. The paper proposes that a reduction or suspension of the obligation would be considered before a general emergency release of reserve stock. Reaching the litre target therefore does not by itself say which stock would be drawn on first, or how quickly either could move.

(c) alone counts tanks. Capacity is not stock, and a terminal able to hold the litres is a precondition for the other two observations rather than a substitute for either.

All three share a unit problem. The opened sources do not state whether the obligation days count consumption or imports, the reserve volumes are described on a consumption basis, and the 50-day figure in the May 2026 announcements is defined against nothing at all. Until that basis is published, an observation reported in days cannot be compared across the documents that use the word.

What is it connected to?

Fills with researchpolicy support for keeping domestic refining, which the same paper treats as a separate axis · port and terminal investment · state and territory stockpiles, which the paper mentions only as able to top up the federal reserve · the International Energy Agency measurement question, excluded above as a contested value question · aviation and freight exposure to a jet fuel or diesel shortfall. Relation type and evidence grade were not confirmed in this round.

What these sources do not say

• What the day counts are measured against. The table of target days does not state whether a day is a day of consumption or a day of imports. The reserve volumes are described on a consumption basis. Nothing opened here reconciles the two, so the obligation figures and the reserve figures cannot be added.
• What the 50 days is. The budget page and the prime ministerial release both print a figure of 50 days for diesel and aviation fuel. Neither defines the unit, and neither states how the obligation and the reserve combine to produce it.
• How the reserve volumes relate to the reserve total. The paper gives about 920 ML of diesel and 240 ML of jet fuel, and separately gives a total of about 1 billion litres. It does not state the relationship between the components and the total.
• The data behind the capacity judgment. The finding that jet fuel has little to no spare storage capacity and diesel limited spare capacity is attributed in the paper to recent stockholding data. That data is not reproduced anywhere in the paper.
• What the diagram labels mean. The figures of 4.9 GL for diesel storage and 1.1 GL for jet fuel storage appear as labels on a diagram. No sentence says whether they are tank capacity or stock held, which is the difference between a headroom figure and an inventory figure.
• How large the co-investment support will be and who can access it. The paper states that the quantum and the criteria are important design considerations. It gives neither.
• Whether the package restores the treaty measure. The paper mentions the International Energy Agency once, in the context of supporting coordinated international action through a release. No opened government document states a projected day count under the treaty measure, a target for it, or a date for returning to it.
• The operative text of the Act. The register listing and the obligation rules were reached at the level of contents and compilation dates. The provision setting the target number of days did not load on any page opened here, and neither did the explanatory memorandum to the bill.
• What extended the temporary reduction. The instrument opened here applies to 2026-06-30 and is recorded as no longer in force, while the paper footnote records a reduction running to 2026-09-30. No opened document carries the instrument that bridges those dates.
• Whether the government accepts the account of non-compliance with the treaty measure. The four government documents opened here carry no statement of the government position on it. The departmental pages that would be the natural place for one did not respond.
• How many people this reaches. Every opened source measures the problem in litres, in days and in dollars. None gives a count of people, a sectoral breakdown or a regional one.
• What the consultation produced. Consultation closed 2026-09-15. Nothing opened here says whether submissions will be published, or what industry and the state governments asked for.

See the evidence

One primary government document was read end to end. The consultation paper is the source of every quantity in this dossier except the budget allocations and the 50-day figure, and it was opened directly rather than through a summarising tool, which is why the design findings are graded high. The budget page and the consultation hub were reproduced in full and compared; the prime ministerial release was seen only as excerpts, and the 50-day finding is graded accordingly. The Act, the obligation rules and the temporary reduction instrument were reached at the level of register metadata, so no statutory wording is asserted here from a primary text. Where the sources disagree the disagreement is left visible rather than resolved — the register records the temporary reduction as applying to 2026-06-30 and no longer in force while the consultation paper footnote records one running to 2026-09-30, and the account of compliance with the treaty measure is a news report on one side and a policy institute commentary on the other, with no determination by a public body opened here to settle it. Ten addresses that would have carried the government position on the treaty measure, the operative text of the obligation provision, or the current stock statistics did not return a page, and they are listed above with the reason rather than dropped. This is a Path A output, a research-based definition, so observation_refs is empty and provenance_mode: press-derived.

People affected

Estimated range Not derivable

The reason and what is missing are listed under “What is missing” below